Najam presented a framework within which the behavior of the developing countries in international environmental politics might be understood - why they behave as they do and what this means for the implementation of international environmental accords.
Beginning with the observation that most international environmental accords treat the developing countries of the South differently ( i. e., developing countries are often required to do less, over longer compliance periods, and are promised resource or technology transfers as precursors to implementation), Najam develops the argument that implementation of international environmental regimes in developing countries is also likely to be different - and more difficult - in the South.
Differences that are more significant at the regime formulation level include:
Motivation: Developing countries do not go through the same "negotiation curve" that industrialized countries do. They often view environmental regimes as another forum for fulfilling their larger interests a greater say in the international system and their continuing concern for development.
"Southness:" This is not simply a case of being poor but is a political behavior depending on a) a perception of political vulnerability and being at the periphery of the international system; and b) a sense of alienation from the global environmental agenda which is driven by the North.
Contractual Environment: A transfer of financial or technological resources from North to South is implied, expected, or promised in most treaties. Developing countries view the fulfillment of this "international" commitment as a necessary pre-requisite to any domestic implementation on their part.
Capacity: International environmental negotiations are often technically complex and time-consuming (therefore costly); the South's capacity to invest the required time and human resources is increasingly constrained.
Another set of differences, perhaps more significant at the domestic implementation level are:
Capacity: "Capacity building" is a widely used but poorly understood concept. That developing countries often lack implementation capacity is widely accepted; however, simply beefing up personnel or equipment will not necessarily improve the "capacity" to implement.
Priority/Agenda: The international environmental agenda is primarily the North's agenda. The priorities of the South are generally different, often having to do with basic survival, poverty eradication and economic development. Moreover, even if those from the South who participate in international negotiations become socialized to the global agenda, the priorities of those at the street-level remain different and make implementation problematic.
Actors: Developing countries are far more influenced by external actors - donors, Northern NGOs, the international scientific community, multinational corporations etc. - than are industrialized countries.
Weak States: Most developing countries are weak states; however, they are weak states imbedded in highly stratified but strong societies. In such states, governments are often balanced amidst complex webs of social bargains - implementation (or lack thereof) of particular policies become components in such bargains.
All international commitments have to be "domesticated" before they are actually implemented. Another way of looking at how implementation of international environmental commitments is likely to be different, and potentially more difficult, in developing countries is to begin by looking at what we can learn from research on domestic implementation (in both industrialized and developing countries).
A review of this research suggests that implementation is a dynamic process of negotiation between multiple actors, operating at multiple levels, within and between multiple institutions. As policy moves through the maze of implementation, it is adapted, co-opted, and redesigned by those who actually implement it. Policy, therefore, is both defined and redefined in the act of implementation. While this process is complex, research suggests that we can identify five critical clusters of variables which are likely to influence implementation (figure 9.1).
The variables in figure 9.1 are equally relevant to developing and industrialized countries. However, in comparing these five variables which influence implementation with the already defined factors that make developing countries "different" one can begin outlining how implementation in developing countries is likely to be more difficult.
For example, the differences in contractual environment will directly influence the "Content" variable with the possible effect of putting off any domestic implementation until international commitments of financial and technological transfers are fulfilled.
Similarly, the institutional "Context" in most developing countries is directly influenced by their being weak states which makes governmental institutions as much conduits of social bargains as avenues of policy implementation.
Importantly, the greater influence of outside actors within the "Clients and Coalitions" variables can, in fact, help more effective implementation where these outside actors (especially donors and international NGOs) are inclined to push particular policies by providing assistance in their implementation.
The importance of the "Commitment" variable in implementation design is particularly acute in developing countries which are different both in the motivations that bring them to environmental agreements and in the priority they attach to environmental issues even when they are parties to treaties. The disconnect between international and local priorities and agendas is most acute at the grassroots level, especially in issues which concern the survival relationship of the poorest and most marginalized populations with natural resources (e. g., forestry, biodiversity, desertification).
The importance of "Capacity" factors has already been highlighted as a major difference.
As one of many examples of how implementation is likely to be more difficult in developing countries especially where the differences mentioned above are not recognized - Najam mentioned tiger protection in India. This is a case where the government is genuinely committed to fulfilling its international commitment and stopping legal smuggling of tiger parts to East Asia. Furthermore, international financing, both through governmental and NGO donors, is significantly available. Yet, the priorities of those at the street-level - both the so-called poachers and the wildlife rangers - are so different and so focused on everyday economic survival that smuggling has continued all but unchecked. Compounding the problem has been a deficiency in understanding exactly what "capacity" needs to be built - the effort has been at strengthening the organizational capacity of the higher strata of government departments rather than, say, the options available to local populations involved in poaching tigers or ranger pay structures.
Najam concluded that: