Levy discussed lessons relevant to the climate issue we might learn from the acid rain case, specifically the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution Treaty (LRTAPT)? The acid rain treaty turned what was a two country problem (Sweden and Norway) into a world issue. It provides a:

• case study of effective translation of macro-level effects to micro-level impacts.
• case study of strategies that effectively overcame the problem of contrary political elements.
• model for generating politically influential scientific evidence and advice.
• model for coping with compliance and implementation problems.
• model for handling the participation question.
• cautionary tale of what happens when neglect capacity bottlenecks, equity problems arise, and financial transfer issues arise (or what happens when ingenuity is applied to transnational understanding and not transnational action)

Effectiveness is a function of ingenuity, luck and circumstances. It will not work to simply look at the acid rain case and copy what worked and avoid the mistakes and hence solve any other problem. Many of the positive outcomes, as well as the failures in the acid rain case, are a function of circumstances. Therefore, lessons are focused on the marginal impact of ingenuity as manifested in creative institutional design and political strategies, and in the absence of potential institutional and strategic choices.

Social problems are a function of low levels of the three Cs:

• concern (interests, understanding)
• capacity (technical, administrative, legal)
• contractual environment (ability to strike productive bargains)

Effective institutions intervene and raise the levels of the three Cs so that social progress is possible.

Evolution of the European Acid Rain Problem

1872 - Robert Angus Smith discovers a local-level phenomenon resulting from the practice of sending sulfuric acid into the atmosphere, and coins the term "acid rain." The problem disappears as this practice died out.

1950s - Interest was sparked in the transboundary flow of sulfur and nitrogen from pollution sources as agricultural nutrients. This was thought to be a good thing as it replaced fertilizer by providing free nitrogen. A monitoring program began to help recipients know how much they were receiving so they could adjust fertilizer applications.

1968 - Svante Oden hypothesizes long range transport as source of Swedish aquatic acidification, and accuses the rest of Europe of launching an "insidious chemical war" on Scandinavia.

1971 - Stockholm conference. Bolin authors Swedish case study on acid rain. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) establishes comprehensive monitoring and modeling program of long range transport.

1977 - Bruntland and Brezhnev agree to seek European convention to limit acid rain.

1979 - Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution was signed by all countries eligible to sign it.

Less than one-quarter of the signatories to the treaty had any interest in the environmental problem, and only Sweden and Norway had a direct interest. A large part of the reason the other 32 nations signed it was because of the timing, coinciding with East-West détente and the move to deepen international understanding. It was two years after the Helsinki conference that there was finally action on this even though Sweden had been trying to get action since 1968. Also, there was new domestic research in Germany that first made the link between acid rain and forest die off.

Table 7.1, arranged by totals, shows total and per capita sulfur emissions and reveals that Sweden and Norway, which suffered most from the problem, had some of lowest levels of per capita emissions. The estimated cost of damage was much higher than the cost of abatement, but since transnational acceptance of cost figures was poor, these analyses had little or no political effect. OECD figures showed that human health effects were very large, but since health effects are local, these studies had little effect politically.

Legal Instruments of LRTAPT

• 1979 Framework Convention
• 1985 SO₂ Protocol (30% cuts)
• 1988 NO_x Protocol (freeze)
• 1991 Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC) Protocol (freeze, cuts; a wider variety of chemicals covered)
• 1994 Revised SO₂ Protocol

The 1985 Sulfur Protocol is an example of politics over science. It required 30% reductions in SO₂ emissions (from 1980 levels) by 1993. While 17 parties signed the Protocol, 11 eligible parties did not. Signatories have reduced their emissions by over 30% while non-signatories reduced by less than 10%. Overall, European emissions were reduced by about 25%. Table 7.2 shows percent change in sulfur emissions by ratifiers and non-ratifiers of the SO₂ Protocol. There are no penalties for not meeting the targets.

During Protocol negotiations, when it appeared difficult to engineer compliance, the agreement was reworked to make it easier. For example, when the Soviets resisted reducing sulfur emissions by 30%, language was added allowing either the 30% reduction or a 30% reduction in transboundary fluxes. This enabled the Soviets to comply by simply moving some coal and oil plants further from their border, and much of this movement was happening anyway for other reasons. (They were also moving nuclear plants closer to their border.) Moving the fossil fuel plants to Siberia caused Arctic haze but that wasn't a concern at the time.

The convention took over the OECD monitoring network and collected deposition data, linked it with historical meteorological data, and used diffusion models to determine impacts. This allowed sources and recipients of emissions to be pinpointed. Two centers handle this effort, one in Oslo and one in Moscow, and this duplication and checking increases political confidence.

In broadening and deepening the scope of the monitoring program, scientific working groups were set up aimed at effects on forests, crops, freshwater ecosystems, and materials. This process integrated monitoring and created new knowledge in a politically motivated way. It also served to actively broaden the base of contributors as well as improve existing information. In a similar way, one major goal in creating the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was to ensure broadening of participation (especially from the Soviet Union) and get buy-in from as many nations as possible.

To what can the reductions in acid deposition be attributed? One key factor was coincidental industrial change (including switching to different fuels). Another factor was the reaction to human health problems at the local level, which coincidentally reduced long range emissions. And many reduction measures were undertaken for reasons of national self-interest. The total amount of reduction directly attributable to the LRTAPT through 1985 is probably quite small.

Regarding the contribution of scientific evidence, while there was scientific consensus on the effects of acid rain on fresh water ecosystems, there was less of a consensus regarding effects on forests and other impacts. Interestingly, the largest political impact came from an area in which the science was the least clear, namely, the effects on forests.

Integrated assessment models like the RAINS model from International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) used critical levels, transport and emission data, and reduction cost data to create optimum reduction scenarios. "Critical load" is defined as the highest load that will not cause chemical changes leading to long-term harmful effects on the most sensitive ecological ecosystems. "Load" refers to the amount deposited from air to ground, while "level" refers to the atmospheric concentration. Using a concept from toxicity, impact and deposition load are determined and the level at which impact goes to zero is aimed for.

Mapping activities were undertaken in which the most sensitive receptor was selected (excluding the 5% most sensitive organisms) and dose response data was used to find the critical load (assessed consensually and revised as needed). A mapped distribution of receptors was prepared and transformed into a map of critical loads/levels (following consensually agreed upon methodology). Total damage is defined as a function of both the amount of deposition and the sensitivity of receptors. This information results in an exceedence map which reveals the areas that exceed the acceptable level and are thus damaged by deposition. There is political power in publicizing results of these mapping efforts. For example, a black triangle on the map downwind of the United Kingdom implicates British emissions.

What is the process of moving from such a mapping activity to a regulatory framework? With the goal of reducing the dark areas on the map, a first order analysis of differences in abatement costs is performed and then simulations of emission reduction scenarios and then deposition scenarios are performed. More reductions will take place where they are less expensive; this is the basis of the tradable permits idea. Variance in abatement cost is largely a function of available fuel supplies and how much reduction had already been done. The RAINS model scenario aims at reducing the gap between a total absence of acid rain and the status quo by 60%; a goal of no acid rain is not deemed feasible for political and economic reasons.

Critical loads in practice turned out to be different than critical loads in theory. After the signing of the Protocol, scientists were dissatisfied because political compromises resulted in environmental harm (as in, for example, the agreement to eliminate consideration of the most sensitive 5% of organisms). In addition, countries adopted different target years for political expediency, measurement errors were exploited, and countries with large land masses (including the Soviet Union and Norway) were permitted to exempt some areas.

Because of such loopholes, critical loads failed as a policy tool. In the end, the Protocol that was signed was simply a codification of the status quo, representing improvements that nations were going to make anyway. According to one observer, this was "a humiliating blow to the scientific effort that has under pinned the running of the Protocol. The replay delivered to the scientists has been: 'No, you are wrong, there is no role for science in international negotiations, we are going to ignore you, you might as well not have bothered to carry out this work'." So, some believe, not only was science irrelevant, but there was no change from the status quo in policies.

But Marc Levy believes that is not the full story. He believes that the European acid rain experience led to an alteration of the political landscape in North America that advanced the cause of reducing acid rain. Further, Levy believes the 80% reductions by the British would never have happened without the Protocol process. In the Netherlands, the Protocol was taken seriously and integrated into domestic law. The Dutch looked for additional sources of pollution, lowered critical load levels, and changed internal laws as a result of LRTAPT.

Positive lessons from LRTAPT that relate to CO₂ emissions reductions

• Contrary political elements can be dealt with via "toteboard diplomacy" (a big obstacle was the United Kingdom's government, which continually opposed action on acid rain). The Sulfur Protocol set forth a toteboard on which responsible and irresponsible countries could be identified. The clear 30% reduction figure set forth a simple standard for assessing this.
• Combine knowledge assessment activities with knowledge creation activities.
• Place dominant focus on effects rather than causes.
• Cast a broad net for relevant impacts to avoid getting stuck in inscrutable ones ("if trees don't work, switch to lichen" as the bioindicator).
• Don't insist on full participation for legally binding instruments; let the variety of a pluralistic processes apply pressure to reduce emissions.
• Concentrate scientific assessment on politically useful outputs (calculation of local impacts and cost-effectiveness).
• Sophisticated science can be politically influential even when the political outputs are scientifically crude.
• Disprove outlandish hypotheses helps.

Negative lessons from LRTAPT that relate to CO₂ emissions reductions:

• No effective international/transnational efforts were made to assist in implementing measures to reduce emissions (developing new technology, matching technology to local circumstances).
• No effective efforts were made to link financial transfers to emissions reductions (rich and poor countries on same legal footing).
• No attention was paid to collaborative work on coping with impacts.
• Thought and action on issues of importance were sacrificed on behalf of issues of concern.