Gyawali brings lateral thinking, specifically from a Third World perspective, to discussions of responses to climate change. He described an extreme climate-related event and how its lessons might apply to the current debate regarding a climate change regime.
In August of 1993, a cloud burst over central Nepal resulted in the highest recorded rain fall in the Kingdom, wiping out much of the infrastructure in the central area of the country. All four major bridges leading to the capital and the nation's largest power plant were severely damaged, eliminating 40% of the nations' power supply and leading to shortages of essential items such as food and fuel in the capital city. The loss of life directly at tributable to the cloud burst is estimated at 2,000 people. In addition, 38 irrigation systems on which agricultural production depends were destroyed, and many paddy fields in the valley plains were left filled with huge boulders, rubble and sand.
The agricultural production of India, Nepal, Bangladesh, China, and other countries in the region are dependent on the rainfall brought by the monsoon from the southwest Indian Ocean. The reversal of the Trade Winds, which blow generally from the northeast, due to a strong low pressure zone in the Punjab Rajasthan plains, brings this periodic feature which is the life blood of these areas and feeds all the major rivers of the region. On average, the region receives 1000 to 1600 millimeters of rain per year, with some local areas receiving as much as 4000 mm. Of this annual amount, about 80% falls during the three months of the monsoon, resulting in a permanent situation of alternating drought and flood. Recent analyses of data show that, for much of South Asia, 50% of the monsoon rainfall comes in just 15 hours, in spells of 50 to 100 mm per hour intensity. How can such an event be managed? How should an attempt be made to provide for storing this water? Should local ponds be built to collect water where it falls, or should high dams at river valley gorges be constructed to collect water where it concentrates?
The location of the "monsoon trough" - the place where the winds actually reverse direction - is critical for determining exactly where the rain falls. The location and amount of rainfall is related to the position of this trough. A 15 kilometer shift in the position of the trough can signal drought or flood for particular localities. This is important because some 500 million people are dependent upon the agriculture of this area. A delay of a monsoon by just 15 days can take people in one locality or another from affluence to poverty. A system of bonded labor has developed over the ages in the feudalism of this area in which several generations of a poor family are required to work to pay off the debt that can result from such a shift in the monsoon trough. Such is the level of vulnerability of the people in this region, most of whom live at the precarious margins of existence.
The cloud burst event that resulted in the extreme rainfall on August 20, 21, and 22 of 1993 is, with recent analysis, considered to be a natural phenomenon that could occur every 10 to 15 years in a given place. However, the intensity of the precipitation was such that measurements were extremely difficult to make. Among the debris carried by the raging torrents of a previously small, nondescript stream was an 8,000 ton boulder which smashed the penstock and intake of the largest powerplant in the country. It was impossible to walk to the gauging station to take readings with the storm intensity so high and continuous lightning flashes and thunder.
The rainfall began suddenly and produced three high level spikes of cloudburst totaling 540 mm. The country's only major hydropower reservoir filled 20 meters in 9 hours. The first spike was characterized by 50-60 mm per hour rainfall, followed by a second burst of 69 mm per hour and then a third of similar magnitude which actually did the most damage. Trees felled by the first two spikes created watercourse obstructions. The last spike uplifted this debris and "bulldozers" made up of trees, rocks and debris moved through the area and wiped out roads, bridges and entire settlements.
A number of lessons involving technology arise from this event. Much of the Third World is in non-temperate zones where violent climatic events are "normal" and require a different kind of technology. On one hand, it is necessary to build infrastructure to withstand extreme events, but on the other hand, this is very expensive. All too often, social pressures determine what is built rather than what managing extreme events requires. The Bagmati irrigation barrage lower down on this river was built with a design flood level of 8000 cubic meters per second even though there was one outlier event on record that reached 12,000 m3/second. The August 1993 event reached 15,000 m3/second and the flooding left huge tree trunks on top of the barrage gates and gantries.
The siltation rate for the Kulekhani hydropower reservoir, consisting of the biggest dam in country with 126 square kilometers of catchment, was estimated by the design study to be 400-700 cubic meters per hectare per year in the original design report done by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The World Bank appraisal reduced it to 400 and it was built accordingly. A survey conducted immediately before the flood showed that the actual 13-year siltation was 4000 m3, ten times the design criteria. Then came the massive flood, and with it came 40,000 m3, 100 times the design figure. In general, dams in the Himalya regions of India and Pakistan have been found to accumulate 4 to 16 times the siltation of the design figures. Much of the siltation comes in pulses of great magnitude every couple of years.
The task of conducting an economic analysis is obviously daunting. The costs of restoring people to their state of well being before an event such as this flood are so enormous that no one has even begun to estimate them for central Nepal.
Social repercussions of the event have been very large. For example, one community which lost its water system to the cloud burst is located in the middle of a national park. This village of very poor, marginal people is extremely vulnerable to such events. The women now have to walk through a national park full of armed guards to collect water, and there have been many instances of abuse and rape connected with this. The community is essentially at war with the state, and such micro political dynamics may provide important lessons of what can follow such events. These kinds of dynamics can overshadow international agreements, especially regarding arrangements such as joint implementation.
Important lessons for climate change include the fact that our scientific understanding of many natural processes, especially those that occur in non-temperate zones, is very poor and must be improved. Such basic science has practical application as it can help with decisions such as how to conduct intervention measures such as building dams so as to avoid damage from extreme events. Another lesson is that it is very difficult to know whether events like this are being exacerbated by climate change or not. Learning more about these processes should help to understand and tackle such questions much better.
In addition, Gyawali believes that social limits to growth will arrive long before physical limits and therefore, we must concentrate on these social challenges or they will make the physical problems moot. "The last man will have eaten the last woman long before the last tree falls," he says.
These social issues are driven by marginality. Marginality, Gyawali says, means having no options. To be marginal means if you don't find a job that day you don't eat that night. Third World governments are so pressured by their many marginal people that they cannot conform to international treaties that will hurt them, even if they sign them. The pressure to do something about poverty is huge. The transition to democracy means that the government has to cater to this constituency (which actually votes).
Gyawali also stressed that in the Third World, the nation state as a unit of discourse is only one of a coalition of loyalties. People also have loyalties based on village, religion, ethnicity, region, language, etc., and the nation state loyalty may not be their highest one. Especially if the state does not serve the interests of the people, their loyalty will be transferred to these other units that often transcend national boundaries, and when that happens, the treaties and discourses based on the nation state unit may become totally irrelevant.
One major difficulty in tackling these realities in the South (and perhaps in the North) is the issue of institutional inflexibility and built in filters that do not allow new ideas through until it is too late. Thompson (Water Nepal 1994 , Vol. 4 , No. 1) says there are early warnings that a technology is headed for entrenchment rather than flexibility. He identifies four indicators of technical inflexibility; beware of projects which 1) are large scale, 2) have long lead times, 3) are capital intensive, and 4) have a need for major infrastructure early on.
He further identifies four indicators of organizational inflexibility; be wary of 1) single mission outfits, 2) closure to criticism, 3) hype (as in "If we don't cover the Himalaya with trees Bangladesh will sink forever beneath the waves"), and 4) hubris (often in the form of over-confidence as to what the future holds, or categorical certainty that "there is no alternative"). Together, these eight factors form a collage of rigidity that makes change very difficult. Implementation of the Climate Change Convention protocols will also be faced with transcending these indicators of inflexibility.